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The History of Camp Tracy: Japanese WWII POWs and the
Future of Strategic Interrogation. By Alexander D. Corbin.
Fort Belvoir, VA: Ziedon Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-578-029795. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 189.
$15.95.
The History of Camp Tracy, which received the Joint Chiefs of Staff History Office's Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Archival Research Award, is
an illuminating and educating read. The book is written by Alexander
Corbin, an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army with military intelligence
experience. Corbin combines his understanding of intelligence collection
with an historical examination of the interrogation of Japanese POWs to
produce a work that should appeal to intelligence professionals and people who wonder how we can prevent incidents like those at Abu Ghraib.
Corbin begins by exploring the dilemma the nation faces in detaining and
interrogating terrorists with an Islamic fundamentalist bent. Not only do
our values and religious beliefs greatly differ, but there also exists a language barrier and differences in physical appearances. Corbin persuasively argues that the threat posed by terrorists is actually an experience
that the country has already faced, albeit in a different guise. Corbin
relates that Japanese POWs in World War II were also viewed through
lenses accentuating their differences in values, culture, appearance, and
language.
Despite the strangeness associated with captured Japanese soldiers, the
U.S. military was able to successfully collect intelligence from them. This
contrasts from the military's recent experiences in Abu Ghraib where its
failures have been widely publicized, and also the detention center at
Guantanamo Bay, Camp Delta. Corbin briefly examines the faults associated with these interrogation centers and then launches into a case study
of Camp Tracy, the American World War II joint interrogation center
where Japanese POWs were successfully interrogated.
Although Corbin persuasively demonstrates that Islamic jihadists are
akin to Japanese soldiers, some of the historical parallels are not equivalent. American society has changed since World War II, and it could be
debated whether Americans today would tolerate terrorists being imprisoned on U.S. soil, close to where they live. The author also states that
there has yet to be proof that the intelligence gathered at Camp Tracy led
directly to any intelligence breakthroughs. This is not to say that a lack of
evidence presupposes that it does not exist, but it does weaken arguments
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which seek to accentuate the importance of Camp Tracy and the value of
intelligence gathered at that location.
While not everything that has worked in the past can be transplanted
today, Corbin impressively describes in great detail the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by the interrogators at Camp Tracy.
These techniques, such as pre-screening POWs, false ceilings, the use of
stool pigeons, and applying intelligence already known to psychologically
intimidate POWs, can be successfully incorporated into America's intelligence community. The interrogators at Camp Tracy, unlike many of
America's human intelligence interrogators at Abu Ghraib, received an
extensive education in Japanese language, culture, and interrogation
training. These intelligence professionals continuously modified their
techniques as they sought to improve their intelligence gathering. Most
important, the interrogators at Camp Tracy never resorted to physical
coercion or torture when interrogating Japanese POWs because of their
education, expertise, and moral values.
Another major reason Camp Tracy succeeded was the total secrecy
involved with the site. Not even people in the community of Byron Hot
Springs and Tracy, which were very small towns, knew that Japanese
POWs were being quartered there. It seems in this Twitter age we live in,
that a facility such as Camp Tracy on American soil would eventually be
exposed.
America's human intelligence collection could be greatly improved if the
training, techniques, and culture which existed amongst the interrogators
at Camp Tracy were replicated. The History of Camp Tracy succeeds in
mining an historical vignette such as Camp Tracy to great depths, and
then elucidating how this experience can benefit intelligence professionals. Corbin has ensured that America will not forget the lessons learned
from Camp Tracy. Hopefully, these lessons will at least be partially implemented so that America can successfully collect intelligence while also
disassociating itself from torture.
Timothy Hsia has interned at the Joint Chiefs History Office. He has also
written essays for Small Wars Journal, Foreign Service Journal, and
Army magazine.
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Spaces of Security and Insecurity: Geographies of the War on
Terror. Edited by Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds. Surrey,
England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009. ISBN: 978-0-75467349-1. Pp 288. Plates. Figures. Index. $114.95 (hardcover).
This volume is part of a series on "Critical Geopolitics" edited by Klaus
Dodds, an editor of the current volume, and Merje Kuus. The series seeks
to examine the field of geopolitics, which the editors place as a subdiscipline of human geography. The approach of the series as a whole is
highly multidisciplinary, encompassing popular culture as well as issues
of security, international relations, and global power projection.
There are several main themes that wend their way through this book,
such as the spatial vocabulary of international relations—words and concepts like "homeland," "international community," "failed state" and, of
course, "terrorism." Another theme concerns the way ideas of security
invoke particular kinds of politics; exceptional prerogatives and recourse
to violence that would otherwise not be possible. At the same time, security is as much about the routine as well as the exceptional.
Geography is the effort of humans to seek or impose order—geometries or
power—on the world and its various topographies, or simply find meaning in them. In so doing one tries to establish rules by which those orders
function, rules which are constantly re-imagined and contested. This paradox lies at the heart of the War on Terror and the changing landscapes of
security.
Questions of national sovereignty and the rights of one nation to intervene in the affairs of another make up some of the most controversial
aspects of the larger debate, and the essays in this book make an excellent
primer on this topic. The authors take a realistic view in the sense that
while the rules of international relations demand adherence to concepts
like territorial integrity, national self-determination, and rights of selfdefense, cornerstones of international relations, these are also routinely
violated on both small and large scales. The build-up to the war in Iraq is
examined from several perspectives as a case study to such exceptions.
For the most part they follow the debate to explain or define the "failed
state" that is often used to justify intervention—and as the authors freely
admit, for the purposes of enabling self-serving agendas of those who
would intervene. The question of the extent to which the build-up to the
Iraq War was based on intentional deception on the part of both the Bush
and Blair administrations is examined.
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Most of the essays that make up Spaces of Security and Insecurity were
originally presented as sessions at the annual conference of the Royal
Geographical Society with the Institute of British Geographers in London.
These sessions, which took place in September of 2007, sought to evaluate the ways in which geographers had contributed to the analysis of the
U.S.-led War on Terror, as well as the larger picture of contemporary
landscapes of security. The papers contained in this volume cover a wide
range of geographies, both physical and metaphorical; Afghanistan, the
European Union, Iraq, New Zealand, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and the
United States. The article on Sri Lanka, while informative and worth reading, is nonetheless dated due to the conclusive end of the civil war there,
which was declared ended by the Sri Lankan government in May of 2009.
In each of these cases, one finds stimulating and well-researched examples of ways in which one party or another's dominant vision of security in
the War on Terror has woven into (or collided with) a variety of geographies, and thus become subject to scrutiny and criticism. It is clear that
for some parties the War on Terror is incidental to the opportunities it
creates, namely to facilitate moves towards a preferred state of affairs. For
instance, in the "Introduction" by Ingram and Dodds, they point out that
for certain radical Christian Evangelical groups the War on Terror is
viewed not as a path towards security, but a plan to kill non-believers.
Taking up this theme in a later chapter, Jason Dittmer ("Maranatha!
Premillennial Despensationalism and the Counter-Intuitive Geopolitics of
Security") shows how the apocalyptic leitmotif of global destruction, or at
least coming years of "Tribulation," are viewed with enthusiasm by some
members of that community, and how this is driven both by belief and by
external circumstances of economic security as well as the clash of values
between their own traditional beliefs and the modern world.
Another interesting article is by Nick Megoran concerning "Colonizing
Commemoration: Sacred Space and the War on Terror" in which the
author examines the use of religious ritual, particularly that of commemoration and memorial, as a means of defining the War on Terror, as well as
how the War on Terror has intruded into religious discourse. It is a fascinating study on a seldom-seen aspect of modern geopolitics and the sociological use and abuse of the grieving process.
For this reviewer, the title of Megoran's article was evocative of older paradigms, specifically the concept of "sacred space" described in studies of
both ancient and modern comparative religion and championed during
the previous century by a number of scholars, of whom Mircea Eliade was
perhaps the most prolific and articulate spokesman. This idea, briefly
stated, is that the traditional, myth-based nation was a heirocentric state
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in which its moral, political, divine, and even cosmic integrity were
defined and maintained by the presence of sacred areas such as temples,
shrines, and other holy sites to which the social literally owed its existence. Parallels with modern notions of boundaries and national sovereignty are not hard to find.
To conclude, although there are some articles which may appear to have
been rendered outdated due to the onrush of world events, this is not a
book that should be ignored. Spaces of Security and Insecurity constitutes one of the better discussions of the many issues surrounding the
task facing any nation that wishes to co-exist with eccentric or troublesome neighbors, especially in a world where globalization makes virtually
all nations neighbors, whether they like it or not.
Sheldon Greaves, Ph.D., is an independent scholar.
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The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional
Intelligence Culture. By Ishmael Jones. New York: Encounter
Books, 2008. Appendices. Notes. Bibliography. 383 pp. $27.95.
ISBN: 1-59403-223-8.
The Human Factor is not the ordinary 'kiss and tell' memoir and is unlike
the flood of books assigning blame or credit to the Intelligence Community for the intelligence failures of 9/11, the second Iraq War, the rise of
radical Islamism, and the spread of nuclear technology to rogue states
such as Iran. It also is not a deeply analytical study of how these failures
occurred or how they could be prevented in the future. This volume is less
of an academic study of the Clandestine Service than an extended self
reported psychological study of how at least some of America's best,
brightest, and bravest have been systematically demoralized and driven
quietly from public service.
Ishmael Jones is a nom de plume for a clandestine case officer in the most
secret part of the Central Intelligence Agency, the non-official cover operatives, known as NOCs. These officers operate overseas without diplomatic immunity, often in the most dangerous assignments. If caught they
are disavowed by the Agency, although they are often traded for foreign
spies arrested in the United States. Without diplomatic immunity, NOCs
lack the protection of international conventions covering treatment of
diplomats caught "spying" and can be tortured, imprisoned, or even executed. It would be an understatement to say that this is an inherently
stressful job. Divorce, alcoholism, infidelity, and confusion about selfidentity are standard hazards of the job. As one former colleague of mine
told me after his cover was blown and he had to seek other employment,
"your entire life is a lie. You use your family, your assets/agents, your
friends and your colleagues all to persuade the citizen of another country
to betray his homeland. His life is in your hands, but the persona that you
reveal to him is a lie and you are supposed to remember which side you
are working for."
Jones' book was not authorized for publication by the CIA. He admits that
he cannot fathom why. This makes it all the more intriguing. Who is Ishmael Jones and is anything in the book verifiable? Except for some extensive quotations from the public record—much of it well trod ground—the
answer is no. This limits the utility the book might have had as an accurate guide to what really are the problems faced by the Clandestine Service and how they might be remedied.
Instead, we are left with what appears to be yet another anonymous book
of gripes by an unhappy ex-employee. Yet the vividness of the narrative of
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Jones' career bears a whiff of truth when we compare it to other sourced
and CIA authorized accounts that are every bit as scathing of the intelligence community's shortcomings. Many of his stories demonstrate a wry
sense of humor in difficult circumstances and are quite amusing. As one
wag said, 'even if these stories aren't true, they ought to be.' What we do
know from the public literature is that the Agency has been the source of
enormous wasteful spending, poor accounting, sloppy security practices,
and heavy handed self-serving management. Jones gives us a rare bottom
up view of these problems, in contrast to the more top down academic critiques produced by college and university professors.
The biggest failure of the book is that Jones, writing at the end of his
career, comes across as embittered, arrogant, self-serving, vengeful, and
potentially violent. In a word, he is the perfect target for recruitment by a
foreign intelligence service. This is a shameful situation for an individual
who was (supposedly) a Marine officer, a genuine patriot who put his
country's interest above that of himself and his family. He proudly makes
the point that he was scrupulously honest with government money, when
many of his colleagues were enriching themselves. Even if many of the
details of the book are fanciful or have names changed to protect the innocent, and, by the way, to comply with the law, Jones' story is a mandate
for corrective action. For this we are indebted to him for baring his soul
publicly.
Unfortunately, Jones' self-professed aversion to virtually any kind of
management, which he lambastes on almost every page, makes his proposals of correction of Agency management practices of limited value. He
admits that he never personally served in any senior management post.
Therefore it is not surprising that he fails to connect the pressures that
senior management faces to the operational frustration he and others are
forced to endure. His lack of experience in the maelstrom of the Washington interagency process leaves him insensitive to the conflicts among
intelligence agencies and between the Intelligence Community and the
Executive and Legislative branches. This is undoubtedly the product of
being at the bottom of the food chain. Nonetheless, Jones gives totally
unjustifiable short shrift to the value of technical means of collection,
such as space based assets, signals analysis, military collection, and the
rest of the collection apparatus of the U.S. Government. This leads him to
commit factual errors in his book, such as his inaccurate allegations about
the state of knowledge of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs—
matters well documented in the press critiques and the post 9/11 Congressional investigations.
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Jones is right when he states that heavy handed management led to intelligence failures, but that is true of almost every failure of large institutions. His suggestions for flattening management have already been
implemented in the wake of criticism of the CIA restructuring in the wake
of 9/11, although not as thoroughly as many would prefer. His notion of
shifting all domestic based intelligence to the FBI demonstrates his lack of
understanding of how dysfunctional the FBI is as an intelligence agency
when it comes to foreign threats. The 9/11 disaster was ample proof of
that, as is the continuing bleed of vital technology information to Chinese
intelligence operatives and agents in the United States. His suggestion to
shift foreign intelligence to the military is undercut by the example of
Pearl Harbor.
In conclusion, Jones has written an entertaining and instructive volume
which has a definite place in the study of the intelligence process. Like
every other study of what is inherently a secret business, it must be taken
with several grains of salt. It is a pity what happened to Jones. He, and we,
deserve better. The numbers of stars in the foyer of the CIA headquarters
testify to the ultimate sacrifice of many brave and competent CIA personnel from every branch of the Agency. Unlike the dead, we fail to honor the
'walking wounded' who should not also have suffered in vain.
Donald J. Goldstein is a faculty member at Henley-Putnam University.
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